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 1 
Turning the immigration policy paradox up-side down? 
Populist liberalism and discursive gaps in South America
1
 
 
A paradox of officially rejecting but covertly accepting irregular migrants has long been 
identified in the immigration policies of Western immigrant receiving states. In South 
America, on the other hand, a liberal discourse of universally welcoming all immigrants, 
irrespective of their origin and migratory status, has replaced the formally restrictive, 
securitized and not seldomly ethnically selective immigration rhetoric. This discursive 
liberalization has found partial translation into immigration laws and policies, but, 
contrary to the universality of rights claimed in their discourses, governments reject 
recently increasing irregular south-south migration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean 
to varying degrees. This paper applies a mixed methodological approach of discourse 
and legal analysis and process tracing to explore in how far recent immigration policies 
in South America constitute a liberal turn, or rather a reverse immigration policy 
paradox of officially welcoming but covertly rejecting irregular migrants. Based on the 
comparative analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, the study identifies and explains 
South American ‘populist liberalism’ in the sphere of migration. We highlight important 
implications for immigration theory, thereby opening up new avenues of research on 
immigration policy making outside Western liberal democracies, and particularly in 
predominantly migrant sending countries. 
 
The literature on immigration policy has long identified a substantial policy gap, or 
paradox, of “accepting unwanted migration” (Joppke 1998) in the immigration policies of 
Western immigrant receiving states. Since the 1980s, Western governments have 
embarked on increasingly restrictive immigration discourses, especially rejecting 
irregular immigration, while at the same time accepting the entry and residence of 
substantial numbers of migrants who remain in their territory without authorization 
(Freeman 1995; Sassen 1996; Hollifield 2000; Joppke 1998, 2000; Durand and Massey 
2003; Cornelius et al. 1994, 2004; Mayda 2010; Czaika and de Haas 2013). 
On first sight, South American countries seem to present the unique phenomenon of a 
                                                 
1
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reverse paradox. In the past fifteen years, the governmental immigration discourses, i.e. 
the “text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidents … 
and other members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, 
national and international levels” (van Dijk 1997, 12) 2  of many governments in the 
region have become increasingly liberal, with a clear emphasis on migrants’ rights and 
the promotion of universal human mobility (Mármora 2010; Ceriani 2011). In contrast to 
Europe and the U.S., where governmental discourses clearly distinguish between desired 
‘legal’ and undesired ‘illegal’ immigration, South American politicians and civil servants 
stress the universality of migrants’ rights that apply to all migrants irrespective of their 
national origin and legal status. At the same time, however, South American countries are 
concerned with recent, albeit very small, increases of so-called “extra-continental 
immigration” from countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, and seek to impede these 
inflows to varying degrees (Freier 2013b). Does the liberalization of governmental 
immigration discourses amount to the reverse immigration policy paradox of officially 
welcoming all immigrants but rejecting certain nationalities in practice? Or has there in 
fact been a liberal turn in South American immigration policy making? 
The analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador shows that legislative and policy 
reforms have mirrored the liberalized immigration discourses of governments to a certain 
                                                 
2
 In political science, discourse is seen as a form of political action. “Indeed, most political actions (such as 
passing laws, decision making, meeting, campaigning, etc.) are largely discursive. Thus, besides 
parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government or ministerial regulations, and other institutional forms of 
text and talk, we find such political discourse genres as propaganda, political advertising, political speeches, 
media interviews, political talk shows on TV, party programs, ballots, and so on” (van Dijk 1997, 18). 
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extent, as showcased in the unprecedented incorporation of the “right to migrate” in 
Argentinean and Ecuadorian legislation, Ecuador’s path breaking policy of visa-free 
access and Argentina’s new approach to the regularization of irregular migrants. 
Nevertheless, we also detect substantial gaps between liberal discourses and their 
translation into laws and policies. Recent reactions to increasing extra-continental south-
south migration fall especially far from the governmental rhetoric. The finding that the 
case countries do not fully implement the perhaps elusive universal right to migrate, i.e. 
the de facto opening of borders through universal visa-free travel coupled with 
regularization mechanisms, perhaps is little surprising. The tensions between the 
unprecedented liberalization of South American governmental immigration discourses, 
but varying degrees of legislative and policy reform, and a possible reverse immigration 
policy paradox in the field of irregular immigration nonetheless are well worth exploring.  
The paper makes three important contributions. First, it advances the debate on 
immigration policy paradoxes and policy gaps by showing the reverse scenario from what 
has been considered “a standard outcome” across Europe (Geddes 2008, 350), i.e. that 
governmental immigration discourses are more restrictive than immigration policies. 
Second, it advances theories addressing the determinants of immigration policies by 
exposing short-comings and suggesting necessary amendments for their applicability to 
predominantly migrant sending countries. Third, on an empirical level, the study 
improves our knowledge of immigration policy making and legislation in South America, 
a region that has undergone notable change in the past decade and takes a pioneering role 
in liberal immigration reforms, but remains surprisingly understudied.  
 4 
Identifying developments in immigration policy making outside Western liberal 
democracies has substantial value for the purpose of theory building. It is essential to test 
the applicability of theories so far developed for Western liberal democracies, especially 
when considering the geographical bias of the migration literature. Mirroring the general 
focus of migration studies on south-north flows, the literature on immigration policies has 
unduly concentrated on Western immigrant receiving states, and specifically on the 
United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Bonjour 2011). Given the fact 
that more than forty per cent of all international migration is made up by south-south 
flows (United Nations 2013), the neglect of immigration policies beyond Western liberal 
democracies ought to be of serious concern.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the relevant literature 
on immigration policy paradoxes and policy gaps. The second part introduces the case 
countries Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador and the methodological approach of the paper. 
The third section analyses the liberalization of the governmental immigration discourses 
in the case countries. Section four asks to what extent these discourses have translated 
into legislative and policy change. Section five tests the consistency between the 
liberalization of immigration discourses and policies based on state reactions to recent 
extra-continental south-south immigration. The last section concludes with implications 
for immigration policy theory and avenues for future research.  
 
IMMIGRATION POLICY PARADOXES  
The debate on immigration policy paradoxes has been ongoing for the last 20 years and 
offers three significantly different definitions (Hollifield 1992, 2004; Cornelius et al. 
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1994; Boswell 2007; Hollifield and Wong 2013). Hollifield (1992) first identified a 
“liberal paradox” in immigration policies based on international economic forces pushing 
states towards openness, whilst the international state system and domestic political 
forces are pushing towards greater policy closure. Cornelius et al. (1994, 2004) and 
Castles (2004), on the other hand, conceive the immigration paradox as the failure of 
states to effectively control immigration. A third group of authors understands the 
immigration paradox as the gap between what politicians say and do (Joppke 1998; 
Boswell 2007).  
 Hollifield’s theory of a “liberal paradox” in immigration policies builds on 
political economy, whereas Cornelius et al., Castles, Joppke (1998) and Boswell are 
concerned with the policy making process and its impact on immigration flows. In the 
case of the latter two definitions, substantial confusion about different types of policy 
gaps underlies the controversial debate about what constitutes the immigration policy 
paradox. For the sake of conceptual clarity it is crucial to distinguish between three types 
of gaps. (1) ‘Discursive gaps’ describe the discrepancy between the objectives stated in 
official discourses and policy outputs, i.e. legislation and policies on paper; (2) 
‘implementation gaps’ measure the disparity between official legislation and policies and 
their implementation; and (3) ‘efficacy gaps’ describe the extent to which policies 
actually determine policy outcomes, i.e. migration flows (Czaika and de Haas 2013, 494).  
Cornelius et al. (1994, 2004) and Castles (2004) prominent conception of the 
immigration policy paradox as a “control gap” thus describes an ‘efficacy gap’. Although 
influential, their argument has been exposed as a rather weak because it rests on the 
truism of discrepancies between any policy goal and policy outcomes (Bonjour 2011). 
 6 
The main problem with theories of efficacy gaps is that they equate political discourses 
with policies, and compare what politicians say about their policy goals to policy 
outcomes (i.e. immigration rates), “without taking into account the political processes and 
hidden agendas that lead to various discursive and implementation gaps along the way” 
(see Geddes 2008, 350). It is critical to distinguish among governmental or policy 
discourses, policy outputs (legislation and policies) and policy outcomes (i.e. 
immigration rates) because each constitute a different phase of the immigration policy 
cycle.  
 In our view, the most significant immigration policy paradox thus far described 
by the literature is the discursive gap between restrictive political rhetoric and relatively 
liberal immigration laws and policies in Western liberal receiving states (Boswell 2007; 
Bonjour 2011). Instead of asking “why immigration policies fail” (Castles, 2004), other 
authors have asked “why liberal states accept unwanted migration” (Joppke 1998). The 
startling gap does not lie between restrictive political discourses and persisting 
immigration, which is erroneously interpreted as the ineffectiveness of restrictive 
immigration policies, but rather in the difference between restrictive discourses and 
relatively permissive policies and laws.  
In the case of Europe, such a discursive gap in dealing with irregular immigration 
is widely acknowledged (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998; Cornelius et al. 1994, 2004). 
Mirroring anti-immigration public opinion (Freeman 1995), governments throughout 
Europe have embarked on restrictive and securitized discourses of rejecting irregular 
immigration since the 1980s (Huysmann 2000; Cholewinski 2007). This restrictive 
rhetoric has been widespread both at national level (Geddes 2008; Boswell and Hough 
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2008) and at EU level (Edwards and Kraler 2009, 103-106). Although such 
restrictiveness is mirrored in the adoption of several measures criminalizing irregular 
migration through more stringent border controls, carrier sanctions or expulsion 
(Cholewinski 2007), European governments at the same time implement large scale 
regularizations.
3
 
This paper explores in how far the reverse paradox exits in South America. 
Despite the fact that survey evidence suggests similarly or even more protectionist public 
opinion,
4
 governmental immigration discourses in South America have become 
exceptionally liberal. To answer the question whether a liberal turn took place in South 
America in both immigration discourses and policies, or whether the region presents the 
reverse paradox of officially welcoming all immigrants but rejecting certain nationalities 
in practice, this paper analyses discursive gaps in the immigration policy making of the 
three case countries. Implementation and efficacy gaps are not the primary focus in the 
present analysis. Although it is often argued that the actual implementation of policies is 
more important than their promulgation, policy implementation is extremely difficult to 
measure. Therefore, official policies and laws are often used as a proxy for implemented 
policy (Czaika and de Haas 2013). 
  In order to analyse any gaps between immigration discourses and policies, we 
must first define immigration policies. On the most basic level, they are “rules and 
                                                 
3
 E.g., more than five million third-country nationals in the EU were regularized between 1996-2007 
(Edwards and Kraler 2009, 31-36). 
4
 When comparing survey data from around the time the political discourses started to change in South 
America, e.g. the European Social Survey (2002-03) and Latinobarómetro (2002), South American 
respondents were more concerned about immigrants occupying their jobs than Europeans.  
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procedures governing the selection, admission and deportation of foreign citizens” 
(Brochman 1999, 9) into a state’s territory, especially of non-nationals intending to 
remain and/or work in the country. Although many scholars differentiate between 
immigration and integration policies (Meyers 2000, 1246), there is significant overlap. 
For example, liberal integration policies, such as regularization programs, may attract 
immigrants and compensate for restrictive access regulations. In this paper, we thus apply 
a broad definition of immigration policy and, without applying a set benchmark for 
policy liberalization, compare relevant policy changes on the constitutional level, in 
domestic immigration legislation, and in the areas of visa and regularization policies, to 
the political immigration discourses of each case country. 
 
IDENTIFYING A REVERSE IMMIGRATION POLICY PARADOX IN SOUTH AMERICA 
The paper applies a mixed methodological approach of discourse and legal analysis and 
process tracing (King et al. 1994; Mahoney 2012). It is based on 75 interviews with 
government officials and local experts working in academia, think tanks and NGOs, as 
well as on official documents, academic sources and reports of international 
organizations. Our analysis distinguishes between governmental discourses (both oral and 
written) and official laws and policies. The discussion of discourses is based on the 
analysis of official documents, government declarations and the interviews. Second, we 
analyse a selection of legislative reforms and policies that have occurred in the three 
countries, including ratifications of international conventions and agreements, reforms at 
the constitutional level, immigration laws, implementing regulations and decrees, and 
regularization programs. Given the difficulty to detect overall trends towards 
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restrictiveness and liberalism in immigration policies (Czaika and de Haas 2013), it is 
essential to identify regional developments and policy gaps in specific immigration 
policy areas. We thus further test the consistency between the liberalization of 
immigration discourses and policies by assessing political reactions to the recent increase 
in irregular immigration.  
The three countries under analysis, Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, share certain 
common traits. First, they are among the countries in the region that have experienced the 
largest immigration and/or asylum flows in past decades (IOM 2010a). These flows are 
mainly composed of citizens from other South American countries, which has led to the 
adoption of regional migration initiatives at the level of the Andean Community, 
MERCOSUR, and most recently UNASUR. At the same time, all three countries have 
recently experienced increasing irregular south-south immigration and asylum inflows 
from the Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Freier 2013a). Despite these recent movements, 
the foreign born populations in the case countries do not represent a large percentage of 
total population.
5
 Second, these countries experienced considerable emigration waves 
since the 1980s and 1990s, which accentuated during the first years of the 21st century 
(OAE 2011). Finally, in all three cases, legislative migration frameworks were adopted 
during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, which were mainly concerned 
with population control as embedded in the state’s security agenda.  
                                                 
5
 According to the 2010 Census, there were 1,805.957 foreign-born nationals in Argentina representing 
4.5%. In Ecuador there were 181,848 or 1.2% of the total population (IOM 2012) and in Brazil around 1.5 
million or 0.8% in 2010 (IOM 2010b). 
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Despite these similarities, Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador also represent distinct 
cases along the liberalization continuum. Whereas Argentina has implemented the most 
comprehensive and progressive immigration reform, Brazil and Ecuador have taken more 
contradictory or hesitant steps to modernize their legislative frameworks, thus presenting 
larger gaps between their discourses, on the one hand side, and laws and policy on the 
other. We will emphasize the Argentinean case throughout the paper since it is the only 
of the three countries, which has adopted a comprehensive new immigration law since 
2004. Furthermore, the Argentinean immigration reform is known to have influenced 
developments in immigration policy making at the regional level (Margheritis 2012; 
Ceriani 2011). 
 
LIBERAL DISCOURSE  
In contrast to the increase of tougher immigration discourses in many Western liberal 
democracies since the 1980s, in which governments promise to crack down on irregular 
immigration (Huysmans 2000; Bigo 2002), the reverse development has taken place in 
South America. In the 1970s and 1980s, South American military dictatorships had tried 
to limit population movements as a means of political control with a complete disregard 
for migrants’ rights (Schindel 2006; Durand and Massey 2010). Although the last 
military dictatorships in the Southern Cone subsided in the 1990s, the official 
immigration discourses remained securitized, restrictive and often openly racist (Oteiza 
and Novick 2001; Albarracín 2003; Domenech 2009; Ceriani 2011; Bastia and vom Hau 
2013).  
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In the past fifteen years, however, a liberal tide has swept across South American 
immigration discourses, with an unprecedented focus on migrants’ human rights 
(Mármora 2010; Ceriani 2011). This discursive paradigm shift is also apparent in various 
regional documents such as the declarations of the summits of the consultative process 
SACM (South American Conference on Migration), which reflect a “consensus against 
the criminalization of (undocumented) migrants” (Hansen 2010, 26). In fact it may be 
argued that South America, through the declarations of both the SACM and national 
governments, is the region with the most progressive discourse in terms of the 
recognition of universal migrants’ rights, including those in an irregular situation. 
In Argentina, a more liberal discourse took shape after Néstor Kirchner won the 
presidential election in 2003. Having himself been a persecuted victim of the last 
dictatorship, Kirchner left no doubt that human rights, including migrants’ rights, were 
central to the agenda of his new government (Nicolao 2008; Maurino 2010). This 
discursive shift must be understood against the backdrop of the increasing cooperation 
between historically strong civil society organizations, for whom migration reform had 
long been a priority issue, and the first Kirchner administration (Bonner 2005; Ceriani 
and Morales, 2011). Kirchner won the 2003 presidential election with only 22% of the 
vote after his contester Carlos Menem declined to run for the required second round. 
Kirchner was in need of political allies and embarked on a human rights discourse, 
thereby seeking the support of the civil society.  
 12 
In addition, the massive increase in emigration after the 2001 financial collapse
6
 
led the government’s commitment to reforming their immigration policy in order to set 
an example for the kind of treatment they expected from European governments 
(foremost Spain) for Argentinean nationals (Nicolao 2008; Maffia 2010). In fact, the 
rejection of U.S.-American and European immigration policies, especially the Returns 
Directive -to be discussed below- became an important element of Argentina’s liberalized 
immigration discourse (Acosta 2009).  Such critique went hand in hand with calls for 
political solidarity and reciprocity. In the context of substantial Argentinean emigration to 
Spain after the 2001 economic crisis, Néstor Kirchner’s administration repeatedly called 
on Spain to remember the historic solidarity Argentina had with thousands of Spanish 
emigrants at the turn of the 20
th
 century and to regularize Argentinean immigrants based 
on the logic of historic reciprocity.
7
  
While Néstor Kirchner’s discourse focused on migrants’ rights in the context of 
emigration, his successor (and wife) Cristina Kirchner went even further and discursively 
constructed historic immigration analogies between former European and more recent 
regional and extra-continental immigration. When implementing the regulation of the 
2004 Immigration Law in 2010, she publically declared a historic continuity between 
European immigration and newer waves of Latin American and Asian immigration to 
Argentina. This shift in Argentina’s immigration discourse is especially interesting 
                                                 
6
 More than 200.000 Argentineans left the country in the period 2000-2003 (Actis and Esteban 2007, 211 
and 252). 
7
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/532881-proyectan-en-el-gobierno-un-acuerdo-migratorio-con-espana
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because racism in form of aspired ‘whitening’ of the population had been critical to 
Argentinean immigration policies since the mid-19
th
 century (Bastia and vom Hau 2013). 
Christina Kirchner has since embarked on a more polemic, populist position and 
has rejected the re-emergence of xenophobic sentiments in “so-called developed 
countries” in the context of the financial crisis and described Argentina as part of a 
worldwide, morally superior, avant-garde in immigration policy making.
8
 Intriguingly, 
official statements of the formally often openly racist National Directorate for Migration 
(Dirección Nacional de Migración, DNM) (Albarracín 2003) also follow this rationale. 
In January 2013, State Secretary for Migration, Martín Arias Duval confirmed the 
DNM’s commitment to save-guarding migrants’ rights, comparing the motivations and 
vulnerability of south-south immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Senegal not 
only with European immigrants to Argentina, but with Argentineans who had left the 
country in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis.
9
  
Similarly, though with less political salience, migration re-emerged as an 
important political issue in Brazil in the context of increased emigration since the early 
2000s. Brazil had historically been a destination for migrants until the 1960s (Póvoa and 
Sprandel 2010) but shifted to become an emigration country during the 1980s. The 
reduced number of immigrants in the country meant that immigration was mostly absent 
from the public debate at the turn of the century. However, the number of Brazilians 
abroad increased dramatically from around 2 million in 2002 to approximately 3 million 
in 2008 (IOM 2010b, 40). It is within this context of emigration that Brazil became more 
                                                 
8
 http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/pdf_varios/periodico/periodico_201005.pdf 
9
 http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/accesible/?mostrar_novedad=1755 
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vocal in its defence of its nationals abroad, notably following Brazilian’s expulsions from 
the United States or impediments to enter Spain, which found great repercussion in the 
media (Braga and Gonçalves 2008). During the adoption of the legislation establishing a 
regularization procedure in 2009, President Lula da Silva vehemently criticized 
restrictive immigration policies in Europe and the United States as inadequate. At the 
same time, he stressed Brazil’s comparatively liberal approach to immigration and the 
country’s respect for the human rights of migrants. He also presented Brazil as a country 
that was proud of its immigration history, and emphasized the need to be “generous with 
human beings from any part of the world who would like to live [in Brazil] and … build a 
future”.10 The emphasis on migrants’ rights can also be seen in the 2010 proposal for an 
immigration policy plan by the National Immigration Council (Conselho Nacional de 
Imigração, CNIg)
11
 and in the official statements of its President Paulo Sérgio de 
Almeida (de Almeida, 2009). 
Lastly, both Argentina’s and Brazil’s commitment to reforming their immigration 
laws are also related to the regional integration process in the context of MERCOSUR, in 
which both countries compete for ideological “post-neoliberal regional leadership” 
(Margheritis 2012). Argentina has historically been the most important migration 
destination country in the region, and therefore has taken the lead in the formulation of 
more progressive and social immigration policies (Nicolao 2008). In both countries, 
                                                 
10
  Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante cerimônia de sanção da lei que 
anistia estrangeiros em situação irregular no Brasil. Ministério da Justiça – Brasília-DF, 02 de julho de 
2009, available at http://www.imprensa.planalto.gov.br/  
11
 Proposal from the Conselho Nacional de Imigraçao: Política Nacional de Imigração e Proteção ao(a) 
Trabalhador(a) Migrante. 
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migration and human rights have become part of the political and social agenda they 
promote both at home and abroad (Margheritis 2012).  
The Ecuadorian governmental migration discourse, which was equally 
constructed based on concerns about the treatment of emigrants in the United States and 
Spain, surpasses Brazil and Argentina in its ‘anti-imperial’ tone. Migration and 
specifically emigration have been priority issues in the populist political discourse of 
President Rafael Correa since his electoral campaign of 2006. Similarly to Argentina, 
migrants’ rights were a main theme in the construction of an identification platform for 
his political movement PAIS (Patria Altiva I Soberana) (Margheritis 2011). In the 
context of Ecuadorian mass emigration after the economic crisis of 1999, Correa was 
well aware that migrants’ rights and U.S.-American and European closure towards 
Ecuadorians were highly effective topics when he stood in the 2006 presidential 
election.
12
  
 In his campaign, Correa promised that he would lead a “migrants’ government” 
and after his ascension to power, the political migration discourse started to be framed 
around human rights (Margheritis 2011, 207). In 2008, Correa renamed the European 
Return’s Directive the “Directive of Shame”.13Around the same time, the Ecuadorian 
Foreign Ministry published an open letter signed by Correa addressing “all Ecuadorian 
citizens of the world”, in which he invites emigrants to return home, laments that the 
                                                 
12
 In the so-called ‘emigration stampede’ (estampida migratoria) that followed the economic crisis of 1999, 
close to 140,000 Ecuadorians emigrated to the United States and some 320,000 to Spain until 2005 (Bertoli 
et al. 2011). 
13
http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=83481&umt
=presidente_correa_critica_falta_voluntad_regional_para_protestar_contra_directiva_retorno 
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policies of past governments forced them to leave their “beloved home country” and 
criticizes the discriminatory immigration policies of northern receiving countries. The 
letter also touches on immigration policies in that it declares that there are no “illegal 
citizens, only practices that violate the rights of persons” and that Ecuador, as it demands 
rights for its citizens abroad, promotes these same rights for immigrants in Ecuador. Just 
days before the European Parliament approved the Returns Directive in June 2008, 
Correa further claimed that he would “do away with the invention of the 20th century of 
passports and visas”.14 
In sum, governmental migration discourses in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador 
shifted from closure and securitization to emphasize migrants’ human rights, non-racism, 
and non-criminalization. These often polemic and populist liberal discourses developed 
in the context of emigration and diaspora polices in strong counter-position to restrictive 
immigration rhetoric in the United States and Europe, from which South American 
governments demand solidarity and political reciprocity, i.e., the regularization of their 
nationals. Although the specific political context of liberalized immigration discourses 
was South American emigration to Western liberal democracies, proclaimed values of the 
universality of migrants’ rights and the necessity for regularization measures fed back 
into the country’s immigration discourses based on the logic of coherence and political 
reciprocity. The governmental immigration discourses in the case countries thus 
developed in the context of what we call ‘populist liberalism’. The popular support of 
                                                 
14
Agencia EFE, 12 June 2008, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/correa-elimina-el-visado-a-los-
extranjeros-297707-297707.html 
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migrants’ rights in the context of emigration led to the concurrent support of liberalized 
immigration discourses.  
 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY LIBERALIZATION 
Placing a special focus on the policy field of irregular immigration, this section analyses 
in how far the liberalization of governmental immigration discourses in the case countries 
translated into legislative and policy change. Regarding the international legal 
framework, there have been some important steps affecting migrants in an irregular 
situation. Both Argentina (2007) and Ecuador (2002) have ratified the 1990 UN Migrant 
Workers Convention. Even more importantly, the entry into force of the MERCOSUR 
Residence Agreement in 2009 has transformed the migration regime for South American 
migrants. The Residence Agreement provides that any national of a MERCOSUR or 
associate member state
15
 may reside and work for a period of two years in another 
member state if they have a clean criminal record. This temporary permit may then be 
transformed into a permanent one, provided the individual has enough resources to 
sustain himself in the territory of the host state.  
  
Argentina’s New Law and the Right to Migrate 
In Argentina, the 1981 law,
16
 popularly named after the country’s infamous dictator 
Videla, significantly curtailed the rights of migrants, especially those in an irregular 
                                                 
15
 MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, since 2012, Venezuela. The Associate 
States, which benefit from the agreement, include Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
16
 Decreto Ley 22.439/81, Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigración. 
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situation. Irregular migrants could be detained and expelled without judicial oversight 
and there was no maximum detention period established by law before expulsion took 
place (Ceriani and Morales 2011, 5). This restrictive approach, coupled with the very few 
possibilities that the law offered for regularization, kept large numbers of migrants, 
mainly from neighbouring countries, in an irregular situation. Undocumented immigrants 
lacked basic social rights, such as health care or education. Furthermore, there was a 
widespread obligation for civil servants in hospitals, schools, administrative authorities or 
notary publics to denounce migrants in an irregular situation. Citizens who helped 
irregular immigrants out of philanthropic reasons were subject to a fine (Mármora 2004).   
In line with the previous tradition of regularizations (Sassone 1987), the first 
governments after the country’s return to democracy approached the situation of 
substantial irregular immigrant populations with the adoption of two large-scale 
regularization procedures in 1984 and 1992, which benefited 136.000 and 224.000 
migrants respectively (Pacecca and Courtis 2008, 43). However, these regularizations did 
not mark a shift in Argentina’s restrictive immigration policies. Although 
counterintuitive, regularization programs can be part of restrictive immigration policies 
when they are used in order to “wipe the slate clean and begin afresh” (Massey 2007: 
312), possibly employing even more restrictive measures.  In fact, the Videla Law was 
not repealed and its decrees of 1980s and 90s, rather than softening some of its most 
restrictive provisions, aggravated the limited rights of migrants in an irregular situation.
17
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The 2004 Argentinean Immigration Law,
18
on the other hand, represents a 
remarkable paradigm shift towards policy liberalization – a liberal turn, which did not 
seem likely at the time (Mármora 2004). Indeed, as late as 1999, and amidst widespread 
xenophobic governmental discourse, a draft law was proposed which would have 
deepened the discrimination against non-citizens (Oteiza and Novick 2001; Domenech 
2009). The most noteworthy innovation in Argentina’s migration law consists in the 
recognition of the right to migrate as essential and inalienable to the person. According 
to Article 4, Argentina guarantees this right, which at the time of its adoption did not 
exist in any other legislation, on the basis of the principles of equality and universality, 
although subject to the conditions established in the law as Article 5 emphasizes.
19
  
With its 2004 immigration law, Argentina opted for a new strategy, moving from 
the logic of criminalization and expulsion to the rational of legalization and integration. 
This is evident in the law’s social provisions since irregular migrants now have the right 
to education and health care. Moreover, the staff in educational facilities or hospitals are 
not obliged to inform the authorities about immigrants’ irregular situation, but shall rather 
guide them towards regularization.
20
 Finally, they can only be detained to prepare their 
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expulsion for a maximum period of 15 days and only after a judicial process with various 
possibilities for appeal.
21
 
In our view, the situation of migrants in an irregular situation is an excellent case 
to test the meaning of this provision. If in fact a true right to migrate exists, those who, 
for one reason or another, irregularly reside in the country should have ample possibilities 
to regularize their status. The understanding of the obligation and suitability of 
facilitating the acquisition of regular status is well entrenched in the law and its 
implementing 2010 regulation. Article 17 establishes that the government shall provide 
the adoption and implementation of measures aiming at regularizing the migratory status 
of non-nationals.
22
 In line with this, regularization has taken place through two different 
procedures: regularization programs and a regularization mechanism. We understand 
regularization programs as procedures, which run for a limited period of time and target 
specific categories of non-nationals in an irregular situation. By contrast, regularization 
mechanisms are procedures, which are enshrined in the law without a time limitation and 
from which any non-national in an irregular situation may benefit (Baldwin-Edwards and 
Kraler 2009, 8).  
There have been two regularization programs in Argentina. The first one benefited 
non-MERCOSUR migrants in 2004,
23
 whereas the second one, known as “Patria 
Grande”, anticipated the entry into force of the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement in 
2009. Patria Grande developed in various steps. Article 23(l) of the 2004 Immigration 
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Law provides that nationals of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile can obtain a temporary 
residence based on citizenship criteria. This was later extended to the nationals of the 
other associate member states: Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.
24
 Nationals of these 
countries who entered Argentina before 17 April 2006 were able to regularize their 
situation whereas those who entered after that date could directly benefit from the 
citizenship criteria in the law and obtain a temporary residence permit.
25
  
As mentioned earlier, regularization programs had already been previously 
adopted in Argentina and have been extensively used in other countries in the EU 
(Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009, 31) and South America. However, the Kirchner 
administration’s public endorsement represents an important contrast to other 
regularization agendas. In the EU, regularization programs have been notoriously absent 
in the discourses and documents of common immigration policy making and can be 
considered a political taboo (Walters 2010; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009). Indeed, 
following the 2005 Spanish regularization (Sabater and Domingo 2012) and especially 
during the EU’s French presidency in 2008, there were strong attempts, even if 
unsuccessful, to forbid regularization programs at EU level (Collett 2008).  
Regularization mechanisms are the second approach Argentina’s immigration law 
provides to irregular immigration. In the EU, many member states used them in the past 
or currently incorporate them into their immigration laws (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 
2009, 48-50). There are however crucial differences between the European and 
Argentinean model. In the case of Europe, the conditions for regularization usually 
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include a certain length of residence, which may need to be combined with a job offer, 
family ties or humanitarian reasons. The most significant EU legislation in the area of 
immigration, the Returns Directive, allows member states to provide third-country 
nationals with a residence permit for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons. 
However, since the main purpose of the Directive is the termination of the illegal stay, 
the alternative mostly employed is the expulsion of the migrant in an irregular situation 
(Acosta 2011). 
The Argentinean legislation, on the other hand, is ground-breaking by 
dramatically shifting the balance from expulsion to regularization. Indeed, the law 
provides that once the irregular situation of a migrant is established, the National 
Migrations Directorate is under the obligation to request him to regularize and to provide 
a period for that purpose of between 30 to 60 days.
26
 This obligation is a distinctive 
attribute of the Argentinean law when compared with the EU. During that period, 
migrants may invoke one of the regularization requirements under Article 23 of the law, 
out of which the one most applied is having a binding job offer as an employee. In 
contrast to regularization mechanisms in Europe, length of residence is not a decisive 
element. Its regularization mechanism reads well with the declared right to migrate. 
However, the law has an important flaw, which impedes certain migrants from obtaining 
legal residence. Article 29 sets out that those having entered into Argentina clandestinely 
do not have the right to stay. The burden of proof falls onto the migrant who has to 
certify his regular entry, for example as a tourist, in order to regularize his status 
(Morales 2012, 336). Although Argentina’s legislative reform largely mirrors its 
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liberalized immigration discourse, and indeed presents a substantial liberal turn in the 
country’s immigration policy making, a discursive policy gap exists between the 
promised universal right to migrate and its translation into law, which in practice only 
applies to immigrants with visa-free access to Argentina.  
 
Brazil’s Hesitant Approach to Migration Reform 
Brazil’s immigration law, in force since 1980,27 was adopted in less than three months 
under an urgent procedure by the former military dictatorship. It places strong emphasis 
on national security (IOM 2010, 53; CDHDI 2011, 15) and has a utilitarian approach to 
immigration linked to national development and the shortage of specialized labor. The 
law has been severely criticized because of its bureaucratic nature and the difficulties to 
obtain secure residence status (Sbalqueiro 2009). Indeed, it provides very few avenues for 
regular immigration and no mechanisms for regularization. There are provisions on 
deportation for irregular entry, overstay and working without permission (Articles 57-64 
Law 6815). These provisions are, however, not applicable to irregular immigrants 
married to a Brazilian or having Brazilian children. With regard to social rights for those 
in an irregular situation, the 1988 Constitution grants access to health care, education and 
the reception of outstanding salaries (Sbalqueiro, 2009: 469).  
 Brazil has not yet reformed its 1980 migration law, which in some respects 
contradicts the 1988 Constitution (CDHDI 2011). A legislative proposal for a new 
immigration law (Projeto de Lei 5655) reached Congress in 2009 but falls short of what 
would be expected from the government’s liberal discourse. In fact, it takes as its 
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backbone the current legislative framework, and in some respects is even more 
restrictive, for example, with regard to naturalization by extending the number of years 
that a migrant has to reside in Brazil from four to ten. The proposed bill has been in 
Congress since 2009, without being adopted and there have been three new proposals in 
2014; one by a commission of experts established by the Ministry of Interior, another one 
by the Ministry of Interior itself and a final one by a Senator, which is being discussed in 
certain commissions in the Senate. 
Nevertheless, ministerial orders (resoluções normativas) of the National 
Immigration Council (Conselho Nacional de Imigração, CNIg) have softened the 1980 
law during the last 15 years. The CNIg is dependent on the Ministry of Labor and is 
composed by representatives of different ministries and civil society, unions and business 
confederations. It is responsible for formulating Brazil’s immigration policy and for 
adopting ministerial orders complementing the immigration law. These are hierarchically 
inferior to the law, and hence cannot contradict it, but rather define policy in areas not yet 
regulated. This legislative capacity represents a peculiarity of the Brazilian legal system. 
The CNIg’s work has led to the partial liberalization in central issues of Brazil’s 
immigration policy, such as family reunification, renewal of residence permits or access 
to regular status. The law’s opposition to non-highly skilled immigration, however, limits 
the CNIg’s work. The CNIg has made further important liberal policy proposals, not yet 
adopted, such as a new immigration policy plan or the recommendation to ratify the UN 
Migrant Workers Convention. Agreeing on immigration policy priorities would be 
essential before passing new legislation, but there is internal disagreement between the 
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Ministries of Interior and Labor as well as the Presidency’s Strategies Affairs Secretariat, 
on what such policy should entail (Ventura and Illes 2012). 
The CNIg also supported the 2009 regularization program, by which 45.000 
migrants obtained residence (de Almeida 2009). This was Brazil’s fourth regularization 
procedure after previous ones in 1981, 1988 and 1998 granted legal residence to around 
115.000 non-nationals (CDHDI 2011). The procedure provided two years residence 
permits, which could be renewed and transformed into permanent residence under certain 
conditions, notably having regular employment, exercising a profession or having 
sufficient resources.
28
 Brazil also adopted a bilateral agreement with Bolivia in 2005, by 
which around 20.000 Bolivians regularized their situation (de Almeida 2009, 24). With 
the internal adoption of the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement in 2009, Bolivians have 
the right of entry to work and reside in Brazil. Although Brazil’s outdated immigration 
law does not capture its open political discourse on immigration issues, the CNIg has had 
some leeway to develop policies in line with a less restrictive and securitized vision of 
international migration.  
 
Ecuador’s Constitution and its Contradictory Legal Regime 
In Ecuador, the legislative migration framework in force since 1971
29
 constitutes another 
example of a largely restrictive, and in comparison to the liberalized discourse, ‘outdated’ 
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approach that criminalizes migrants in an irregular situation and limits their rights 
(Arcentales and Garbay 2012). The law provides for no regularization mechanisms for 
those whose visas have expired, not even when the person has children with Ecuadorian 
citizenship (Arcentales and Garbay 2012, 34). Furthermore, there are very few avenues to 
obtaining a regular residence permit for non-skilled or self-employed workers (Hurtado 
and Gallegos 2013, 17). Against the background of the significant Colombian population 
present in Ecuador – with an estimated 90,000 Colombians with rejected asylum 
applications (Hurtado and Gallegos 2013, 11) – this has led to an increasingly large 
number of migrants in an irregular situation.  
The 1971 law favors deportations and the administrative authorities enjoy wide 
powers during the expulsion procedure with few possibilities for redress, which has led to 
various instances of collective expulsions (Benavides et al 2007, 57-58). Detention before 
expulsion in prisons or in overcrowded detention centers is a widespread practice (ibid. 
59-62; Hurtado and Gallegos 2013, 20). Moreover, according to Article 37 of the 
Migration Law, those migrants who, having been expelled, re-enter into the territory 
without a valid authorization, may be imprisoned between six months and three years. 
Finally, irregular migrants face obstacles in accessing basic rights such as payment of 
outstanding salaries, education and health care (Hurtado and Gallegos 2013). 
 To date, Ecuador has not reformed its 1971 migration law. Efforts to develop a 
comprehensive ‘Law of Human Mobility’ covering immigration, emigration, transit, 
return migration and asylum, are ongoing within the Vice-Ministry of Human Mobility, 
formerly known as the National Secretariat of Migrants (SENAMI), and are supported by 
international actors, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the 
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UN Committee on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers. However, the 
liberalization of the governmental migration discourse found representation at the 
constitutional level and in Ecuador’s visa policy. 
The 2008 Constitution enshrines the state’s commitment to define and implement 
a migration policy that will support migrants’ universal rights, combat discrimination, 
and even promote the ideal of universal citizenship. Article 9 lays down the same rights 
and obligations for Ecuadorians and non-nationals and Article 40, following the 
Argentinean example, recognizes the right to migrate and provides that no human being 
will be considered as an illegal due to their migratory status. In turn, Article 416 invokes 
the concept of universal citizenship as a guiding principle for Ecuador’s international 
relations. The constitution further incorporates an anti-imperial, post-colonial discourse 
and “advocates the principle of universal citizenship, the free movement of all inhabitants 
of the planet, and the progressive extinction of the status of alien or foreigner as an 
element to transform the unequal relations between countries, especially those between 
North and South” (Article 416). Finally, Article 11 imposes a prohibition to discriminate 
on several grounds, including the ethnicity, origin and migratory status of a person. 
Ecuador’s constitution represents significant innovation in comparative 
perspective, since it is the first constitution in the world, in which the right to migrate is 
enshrined. Theoretically, it transforms the government’s control over the relationship 
between territory and population by deconstructing the link between rights and 
citizenship as well as the assumption that individuals automatically renounce to rights 
when migrating (Arcentales and Garbay 2012, 7). This approach to migrants’ rights goes 
even further than other proposals on postnational membership (Soysal 1994), since 
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judges, administrative authorities and civil servants shall directly apply the constitution 
and international human rights treaties even if the parties to the dispute do not expressly 
invoke them (Article 426). These constitutional ideals, however, are severely limited by 
the outdated legislative framework. 
The constitution’s prohibition of the criminalization of irregular migrants obliges 
the state to adopt regularization measures (Arcentales and Garbay 2012, 31). The state 
has however habilitated very few possibilities for regularization. In 2010, it provided two 
regularization programs that benefited 400 Haitian and approximately 300 Venezuelans 
and 650 Cubans (Arcentales and Garbay 2012, 47-49). Although Ecuador has signed 
permanent migratory agreements with the countries from which most immigrants 
originate, Peru and Colombia, the agreement with Colombia has not yet been 
implemented. Finally, it took Ecuador five years to finally implement the MERCOSUR 
Residence Agreement in April 2014. This should, if properly implemented in practice, 
solve the situation of Colombian and Peruvian nationals who, together with nationals 
from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia, now have the right to 
reside and work in Ecuador.
30
 However, the high fees imposed to obtain the temporary 
(230 US dollars) and permanent (350 US dollars) residence permits may act as a deterrent 
considering that the minimum monthly wage in Ecuador is of 340 US dollars.  
Recent changes in Ecuador’s visa policy, on the other hand, at least in a first 
instance, reflected the president’s liberal discourse. On 20 June 2008, Ecuador adopted a 
policy of open borders, withdrawing visa requirements for all countries in the world. This 
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unprecedented policy of universal visa freedom, implemented by presidential decree, 
allowed any foreigner to enter Ecuador’s territory for up to 90 days. The official goals of 
this policy were two-fold: one was to encourage tourism, the other to implement the 
principle of universal citizenship (Freier 2013b). This policy reads well with the 
constitution’s declaration of the right to migrate. However, in order to extend the 
permitted stay of 90 days, the individual needs to apply for a residence permit. The 
limited possibilities for obtaining a permit, as provided by the current legal regime, has 
led to a further increase in the number of migrants in an irregular situation. Furthermore, 
visa requirements have been reintroduced for a selected number of nationals, as will be 
discussed below.  
In sum, Ecuador’s populist liberal migration rhetoric is mirrored by the 2008 
Constitution, which stipulates the human right to migrate, and the 2008 policy of visa 
freedom. However, the lack of a comprehensive reform on the legislative level leads to 
incoherence with these discursive and constitutional ideals. The continued criminalization 
of irregular migration through the secondary migration legislation in force since 1971, as 
well as the government’s unwillingness to implement regional agreements on mobility, 
further leave Ecuador in the place of publicly proposing and internationally demanding 
progressive immigration policies based on universal citizenship and migrants’ humans 
rights, without passing and implementing such policies at home. 
 
A REAL PARADIGM SHIFT? CONFRONTING RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
WITH SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION    
 30 
It might be argued that changes in discourses always precede changes in policy, and that 
discursive gaps in Brazil’s and Ecuador’s visa policies are thus just an issue of timing. 
Indeed, with regards to agenda setting and consensus building, South American states 
have taken decisive steps into the direction of immigration policy liberalization at both 
the domestic and the regional level. The actual translation of this new policy consensus 
into legislation and policies might simply take longer. It is, of course, not unthinkable 
that the adoption of new legislations, following the Argentinean model, will narrow the 
gap between discourse and law in Brazil and Ecuador. As discussed above, in both 
countries comprehensive legislative immigration reforms are currently subject to debate. 
However, discursive gaps have persisted for about fifteen years in the case of Brazil, and 
ten years in the case of Ecuador, and can thus not simply be ascribed to the time needed 
for policy adoption. Furthermore, a full translation of governmental rhetoric, i.e granting 
a ‘universal right to migrate’ through de facto opening of borders coupled with 
regularization mechanisms, is little likely in all three countries. 
In order to further test for discursive gaps in policies targeting irregular 
immigration, this section analyses government’ reactions to recent irregular south-south 
migration from extra-continental origins. Governmental discourses in Argentina, Brazil 
and Ecuador proclaim the universality of migrants’ rights, irrespective of legal status and 
national origin. Asian and African immigrants and immigrants of colour have historically 
been most discriminated against in South America (Cook-Martín and FitzGerald 2010, 
2014; FitzGerald 2013). Governments’ approaches to recent increases in south-south 
inflows from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean thus offer a “least-likely” case to assess in 
how far the universal liberal discourses translate into policy measures in practice. 
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We have argued that Argentina is the case country, which has undergone the most 
coherent development between discourse and practice, and that its right to migrate may 
be understood in two possible ways: as an obligation of the state to provide regularization 
avenues and as an individual right to have a time period in which to attempt to regularize.  
However, migrants having entered the country clandestinely do not have the right to stay 
(Article 29 Immigration Law). Given that citizens of neighbouring countries and most 
OECD countries can enter Argentina without visas, this mostly affects south-south 
migrants from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean who started arriving in Argentina 
irregularly, mostly via Brazil, during the past decade (Freier 2013a). The government’s 
response to these new inflows will be illustrated by the case of Senegalese and 
Dominican immigrants.  
The Senegalese population in Argentina is estimated at 3,000 to 5,000 
(Kleidermacher 2012, 113). Senegalese nationals encounter two main problems to 
regularize: First, most entered Argentina clandestinely. Second, due to their precarious 
job situation – many work in the informal sector – they cannot fulfil the legal requisite to 
be working under the direction of another person to regularize their status (Nejamkis and 
Álvarez 2012). Faced with this situation, the Argentinean government decided to launch a 
new regularization program, specifically for Senegalese nationals, on 4 January 2013,
31
 
with the duration of six months. According to the regularization’s legislative disposition, 
there were a number of reasons that led to its adoption: the willingness of Senegalese 
nationals to settle, the impossibility to regularize their status under the permanent 
mechanism due to Article 29, the negative effects their irregular situation had not only for 
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their insertion into the labour market, but more importantly for exercising their rights, 
which may lead to situations of abuse, and finally, the obligation of the state to take 
measures in accordance with Article 17. On the same day, another regularization program 
was adopted specifically for Dominican immigrants.
32
 
Based on these cases, it might be argued that Argentina’s approach to irregular 
immigration shows a considerable level of coherence with its liberalized discourse. 
However, all Senegalese and Dominican nationals who entered the country after 4 
January 2013 continue to face problems to regularize. The same applies to all other 
nationals from Africa, Asia or the Caribbean who entered Argentina without a valid visa. 
Hence, despite the adoption of regularization programs for Senegalese and Dominicans, a 
discursive gap exists in the field of irregular immigration because these offer temporary 
regularization for immigrants of selected nationalities only.  
Brazil’s official reaction to the increase in extra-continental south-south migration 
has been more cautious. The most significant group of recent south-south immigrants are 
Haitians, who usually reach South America via Ecuador, given the possibility of visa-free 
entry, and then travel by land via Peru or Bolivia to Brazil (Freier 2013b). Faced with the 
arrival of around 15,000 thousand Haitian nationals since 2010 (Fernandes et al. 2013), 
the National Committee on Refugees (CONARE) did not grant Haitians refugee status 
since their arrival was driven by environmental issues, notably the situation in Haiti 
following the January 2010 earthquake (Fernandes et al. 2013). However, in cases 
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involving humanitarian circumstances, the CNIg has the final word on the possibility of 
granting residence permits.
33
  
This allowed the CNIg to grant residence permits for humanitarian reasons to the 
approx. 4000 Haitians who reached Brazil before January 2012. From 12 January 
onwards, the CNIg adopted Ministerial Order 97/12, valid for two years, by which 
Haitians could obtain a visa and residence permit because of humanitarian reasons in the 
Brazilian Embassy in Port au Prince. This was then extended until January 2015 by 
Ministerial Order 106/13 of 24 October 2013. The permit is valid for five years and may 
be renewed and transformed into a permanent permit, provided the person is regularly 
employed in Brazil.  
The number of residence permits was originally capped to 100 per month. This 
number was adopted in order to avoid the establishment of a Haitian diaspora in Brazil, 
taking into account the alleged limited capacity of Brazil’s labor market. It was also 
adopted considering that, in the government’s view, not many Haitians would have the 
economic means to migrate to Brazil. It was further argued that providing these permits 
would put an end to the irregular flows in which smugglers were involved.
34
 This visa 
cap was then lifted by Ministerial Order 102/2013 of 26 April 2013, as Haitians kept 
arriving irregularly in Brazil since they could not obtain a visa once the 100 visas had 
been issued (Fernandes et al. 2013: 66-67). Faced with the continuous arrival of irregular 
Haitian immigrants, the Brazilian government decided not to deport them but to continue 
                                                 
33
 According to Ministerial Order 27/1998, the CNIg has the competence to solve cases not regulated in the 
law, such as granting residence permits in special situations.  
 
34
 Ata da Reunião extraordinária de 12 Janeiro de 2012 do Conselho Nacional de Imigração. 
 34 
granting them a residence permit based on humanitarian grounds. However, irregular 
immigration flows to Brazil recently also include increasing numbers of nationals from 
Nigeria, Senegal or Bangladesh, who cannot regularize their status.  
Thus, in the Brazilian case, there also is a gap between the government’s rhetoric 
and policy reactions to irregular extra-continental immigrants. Similar to the case of 
Senegalese and Dominicans in Argentina, the Brazilian government found a special 
solution for Haitians displaced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. Nevertheless, the 
law does not provide any regularization mechanism, and irregular extra-continental 
immigrants depend on the discretionary power of the CNIg to legalize their status.  
Ecuador, in turn, represents the country where the gap between liberal discourse 
and policy reactions to extra-continental immigrants is widest. Correa had claimed that he 
would “do away” with passports and visas, and indeed passed policies of open borders. 
However, universal visa freedom to Ecuador was short-lived. Only six months after its 
introduction, visa requirements were reintroduced for Chinese citizens, and 18 months 
later for citizens of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Somalia. State Secretary of Migration, Leonardo Carrion, linked the 
decision of the partial reintroduction of visas to emerging “unusual immigration flows” 
from the above countries. A majority of visitors from these countries, he explained, 
overstayed the permitted visa-free period of 90 days. It needs to be pointed out that the 
immigration of the concerned nationalities increased only on an extremely small scale 
after the introduction of visa-free access. With the noteworthy exception of Chinese, 
Cubans and Haitians, the yearly immigration rates for other African and Asian nationals, 
for whom visas were reintroduced, averaged at just above 300 per year from 2008-2010 
 35 
(Freier 2013b). With the reintroduction of visas, Ecuadorian policy was responsive to its 
own unintended impact, namely the increase of immigration from Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean. Given that there are no regularization measures, there are currently thousands 
of extra-continental immigrants, most prominently Cubans,
35
 in an irregular situation in 
Ecuador. 
The above analysis shows considerable variation in government reactions to 
irregular extra-continental immigration. Argentina and Brazil present similar cases. Both 
governments found solutions for the largest groups of irregular extra-continental 
immigrants in the countries, Senegalese, Dominicans and Haitians. In Argentina, the 
regularization program could only be achieved after extensive lobbying of the 
Ombudsman and civil society organizations, and does not extend to all other immigrants 
who entered without a visa. Brazil presents a similar situation, where initial government 
reactions to increasing inflows of Haitians were ambiguous at best, but the CNIg could 
push through regularization procedures. Other migrants in an irregular situation do not 
have the possibility to regularize their status. In Ecuador the gap between discourse and 
policy reactions to extra-continental immigration is widest. Extremely small inflows of 
extra-continental migrants led the government to abandon its policy of universal visa free 
access, and there are almost no regularization measures in place.  
Restrictive reactions to irregular immigration in themselves might not be 
surprising. In the South American context, however, they present a reverse immigration 
policy paradox of publically welcoming all immigrants regardless of legal status or 
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national origin, but de facto excluding south-south immigrants from Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean. As a result there persists a gap between what South American governments 
demand from Western migrant receiving states, i.e. regularization policies irrespective of 
the legal status and national origin of immigrants, and the policies they implement at 
home.  
There are at least two reasons, which may be advanced in an effort to try to 
explain this reverse paradox. First, immigration policy liberalization, most notably 
regularization procedures and the MERCOSUR residence agreement, primarily targets 
regional migrants. Most migratory movements in South America are intra-regional and it 
was the large percentage of regional migrants in an irregular situation that led to policy 
liberalization (Mármora 2010). Second, restrictive reactions to extra-continental 
immigrants may also be intertwined with racial discrimination. It is well documented that 
racial and ethnic discrimination continue to be contentious issues across Latin America 
(Wade, 1997;  Beck et al. 2011). At least in the Ecuadorian case, alleged security 
concerns that officially determined the restrictive reaction to the increase in extra-
continental south-south migration are closely intertwined with ethnic considerations 
(Holloway 2012; Freier 2013b). Anti-racism can thus be politically salient in populist 
systems and at the same time, as Cook-Martín and FitzGerald (2014) suggest, fragile. 
Politicians are likely to be caught in the dilemma of serving somewhat schizophrenic 
public opinion; the demand for migrants’ rights and regularization programs for 
emigrants in Europe and the U.S. and the concurrent acceptance of the liberalization of 
immigration policies in the light of political coherence, on the one hand, and 
protectionist, and even racist, public opinion, on the other. Indeed, Ecuador seems to be a 
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paradigmatic case in this regard. Over 60 per cent of Ecuadorians agree that rich 
countries have the responsibility to accept immigrants from poorer countries, but at the 
same time approximately 75 per cent believe that only few or no ethnically distinct 
immigrants and immigrants of poorer countries should be allowed in Ecuador 
(Latinobarómetro 2007, 2009). 
 
THEORY-BUILDING AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study challenges what has been considered common wisdom in theories on 
immigration policy, i.e that, in line with public opinion, countries’ governmental 
immigration discourses are significantly more restrictive than their immigration policies 
in practice. Our three South American case countries indeed present a reverse 
immigration paradox of populist liberalism, in which the immigration discourses of 
governments are considerably more liberal than their policies and laws. Existing 
theoretical approaches to explaining immigration policies are not readily applicable to the 
South American context because they are framed around the assumption that immigration 
discourses are inherently more restrictive than their corresponding policies. Rather than 
presuming such a fixed relationship, the development of immigration policy theory 
should be based on an unbiased analysis of the dynamics and interaction of political 
discourses and corresponding policies and laws. Accordingly, given the empirical case 
studies presented here, the relevance of political perspectives on migration should be 
evaluated.  
The main theoretical approaches in political migration theory can be broadly 
categorized as political economy, neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches 
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(Boswell 2007). Contradicting Hollifield’s “liberal paradox”, political economy 
approaches argue that concentrated group interests outweigh diffuse collective interest in 
decision making processes, and, more specifically, that employers and immigrant groups 
will lobby more intensively to promote liberal immigration policies, than those, who 
perceive to be negatively affected by immigration, will lobby against it (Freeman 1995). 
Doubts have been raised regarding the empirical plausibility of the political economy 
approach (Boswell 2007). Most importantly, it overlooks the fact that the state is more 
than a mediator and in fact plays an active and discrete role in defining immigration 
policies (Boswell 2007). In the South American context, the demands of interest groups 
as a driving force of immigration policies have been further discarded, at least for the 
case of MERCOSUR, due to the top-down structure of its policy making process 
(Margheritis 2012). The relatively small levels of immigration in South America, which 
range between 0.8 and 4.5 percent of the total population in our case countries, are 
another reason to question the applicability of political economy approaches.  
Neo-institutionalists deny the possibility of reducing an explanation of social 
phenomena to the agency of individuals or interest groups and instead stress the 
importance of institutions.  Pointing out that the state is no monolithic entity, they 
distinguish between the system of party politics and the administration, and different, 
possibly competing agencies within it. Neo-institutionalist approaches also stress that 
state interests may significantly diverge from societal interests (Boswell 2007). These are 
important contributions, which are applicable to our cases, for example, in Ecuador. The 
contradictory ideological alignments of the constitution and the migration law, and the 
question, which one should prevail, have led to serious tensions between different 
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ministries and departments dealing with immigration management, depending on their 
political alignment to the president (Freier 2013b). However, existing neo-institutionalists 
theories do not readily apply to the South American context, because, just as political 
economy approaches they focus on constraints – whether the state’s own bureaucratic 
structure, the judiciary, or supranational actors (e.g. Cornelius et al. 1994, 2004; Joppke 
1998) – to implementing restrictive policies, and assume the tension between 
protectionist immigration discourses and relatively liberal policies as a given.  
Furthermore, neo-institutionalist approaches underestimate the governments’ own 
interests. Boswell (2007) thus pledges for focusing on explanations of why and under 
which conditions the state is constrained by institutions. We find her approach of 
conceptualizing immigration policy making in the context of governments’ functional 
imperatives useful to account for the state’s dilemma of wanting to meet competing 
requirements and expectations and thus, possibly intentionally choosing incoherence in 
the field of immigration policies. We do, however, find that scholars have to go further in 
questioning which interests and norms the state feels compelled to take into account and 
to which degree as to avoid the pitfall of presuming a fixed relationship of immigration 
discourses being more restrictive than their corresponding policies. Importantly, none of 
Boswell’s five types of policy responses (2007, 94) are applicable to our case countries. 
Most importantly, Boswell categorizes a “populist” policy response towards immigration 
as a high degree of restriction, whereas this study has shown that in South America, 
immigration policies developed in the context of populist liberalism.  
Regarding constructivist approaches to explaining immigration policies, our cases 
confirm what Bonjour (2011) shows for a “typical Western liberal democratic case” (the 
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Netherlands), that ideas, ideology and moral considerations of politicians and bureaucrats 
play a substantial role in the immigration policy making process. Our cases suggest 
combining constructivist and rationalist approaches in the analysis of immigration 
discourses, policy and law making, thereby providing alternative evidence to the 
usefulness of limiting constructivist approaches to law making as suggested by 
Guiraudon and Lavah (2000) who argue that  “[a] constructivist approach to norms … 
may work in the domain of law, whereas a rationalist one seems more appropriate to 
understand executive agencies’ resistance to these legal norms” (Guiraudon and Lavah 
2000, 189). The rights-based liberalism (Cornelius et al. 1994: 9-11) that is often 
described as lying outside the state and limiting it to implement restrictive policies, is 
propelled from within the state in our case countries. New, liberal norms on immigration 
policies have clearly emerged and reinforced each other in South America on both the 
domestic and regional level. At the same time, policy makers have both been actively 
involved in propelling these norms and drawing on them, at the very least discursively, 
based on domestic political interest.  
Our study also speaks to the literature on immigration policies and race. A 
dominant strand of the literature describes a general development away from ethnic 
selectivity, i.e. immigration policies that address immigrants according to categories of 
race, ethnicity, nationality or country of birth (Brubaker, 1994; Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 
2005, Cook-Martín and FitzGerald, 2010, 2014; FitzGerald, 2013). Contrary to the 
prognosis of the demise of ethnically selective immigration policies in Latin America 
(FitzGerald, 2013), our study suggests that ethnic selectivity needs to be considered as a 
persistent determinant of immigration policies in Latin America. At the same time, our 
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cases confirm a central argument of Cook-Martín and FitzGerald’s work (2010, 2014), 
which questions the antithesis between democracy and racism and shows that 
undemocratic states were the first in the Americas to outlaw racial discrimination in 
immigrant selection. Indeed, Ecuador’s shift towards “competitive authoritarianism” 
(Levitsky 2010) under Correa increased his discretion to implement visa freedom despite 
security concerns and racist prejudice among representatives of the institutions 
responsible for immigration (Freier 2013 b).  
Based on the case studies, we suggest three theoretical avenues for future 
research. First, scholars should further explore South American populist liberalism in the 
area of migration policies, and in this context analyze the relationship between the 
region’s political turn to the left and its (discursive) liberal turn in migration policies. We 
have shown that this liberal shift in governmental immigration discourses and policies is 
based on the rejection of previous restrictive approaches to immigration of former 
authoritarian regimes, and, more importantly, the rejection of U.S.-American and 
European immigration policies. The political salience of emigration and restrictive 
policies of Western migrant receiving states thus suggests focusing not only on domestic 
disputes but on how populist liberal immigration policies are shaped by international 
relations and other countries’ policies in the area of migration (see Cook-Martín and 
FitzGerald 2014).  
Second, the tensions we have traced between populist liberal immigration 
discourses and policies and public opinion further offer a promising avenue of future 
research regarding immigration policies and race. Populist support for liberal reform, 
which is based on the rejection of U.S.-American and European immigration policies, 
 42 
challenges established ideas of elite consensus equaling liberal tendencies and populism 
equaling protectionism in immigration policies (Cornelius et al. 1994; Freeman 1995; 
Joppke 1998; Freeman et al. 2013). Restrictive responses to recent extra-continental 
south-south immigration can be partly explained by schizophrenic public opinion, which 
welcomes immigration policy liberalization in theory but rejects poor and ethnically 
‘unwelcome’ immigrants. The empirical detection of elite racism, as theoretically 
advanced by Valluy (2008), in the paradigmatic case of Ecuador by Holloway (2012) and 
Freier (2013b) invites us to test for this in other cases.  
Third, regarding policy gaps and paradoxes, an important theoretical question to 
ask is in how far populist liberal immigration discourses leave less room for manoeuvre 
for actual policy adoption than restrictive discourses because they do not oppose 
international human and migrants’ rights norms, but on the contrary, propel them. 
Domestic and international activist groups, in such cases don’t have to fight restrictive 
policies, but can rather press for coherence of liberal policies, simply by taking 
politicians by their word.   
Empirically, we suggest that further research on Latin American immigration 
policies should be both narrowed down and broadened in scope. On the one hand side, 
the dynamics of domestic policy making, that could only be superficially traced in this 
comparative study, should be further untangled in in-depth case studies. At the same 
time, large N studies should test whether similar developments are taking place in other 
South and Central American, and Caribbean countries. Although the latter two sub-
regions have experienced similarly or even higher emigration rates, it is likely that closer 
affiliation to the Unites States weakens their liberal immigration discourses. Comparative 
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studies should eventually include other predominantly migrant sending regions to test 
whether the tensions and dynamics between emigration concerns and immigration 
discourses and policies play out in a similar fashion. 
 
CONCLUSION   
In contrast to the much discussed puzzle of “why liberal states accept unwanted 
migration”, which rests on the definition of the immigration policy paradox as the gap 
between restrictive immigration policy discourses and relatively liberal immigration 
policies, it is the exceptionally liberal immigration rhetoric of governments that is most 
surprising in South America. The development of populist liberalism in the sphere of 
immigration has been driven by concerns regarding emigration and diaspora policies and 
took place in counter-position to the immigration rhetoric of Western immigrant 
receiving states that rejects and criminalizes irregular immigration. Our study suggests 
substantial variation in the degree to which legislative and policy change have followed 
discursive immigration policy liberalization. While Argentina’s immigration policies and 
the 2004 Immigration Law present a significant liberal turn, larger discursive gaps persist 
in Brazil and Ecuador, which thus far have not embarked on comprehensive immigration 
reforms. Regarding policy reactions to irregular extra-continental south-south migration, 
all three countries present the reverse policy paradox of publically welcoming all 
immigrants regardless of legal status or national origin, but de facto excluding 
immigrants from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, albeit to varying degrees. 
The aim of this study has not been a normative acclaim of recent developments in 
immigration policy making in South America. Nevertheless, we would like to conclude 
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by emphasizing that some of these developments, such as Argentina’s new immigration 
law, are remarkable from the perspective of the promotion of migrants’ rights. In how far 
there will be a sustainable shift in immigration policy making throughout South America, 
and whether the region could even become a model for policy and law making other parts 
of the world, remains to be seen. 
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